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Tax Competition and the International Distribution of Firm Ownership:
An Invariance Result
Abstract
How does the international distribution of rm ownership a¤ect the outcomes of tax/subsidy com-
petition for mobile plants? As corporate ownership becomes increasingly globalised, this question
becomes increasingly important for policy. We prove a strong Invariance Result in the context of
the tax/subsidy competition between two host countries for a monopoly rms plant. Both the equi-
librium plant location and the equilibrium tax/subsidy o¤ers are independent of the international
distribution of the rms ownership. The reason is that the tax/subsidy competition equalises the
rms post-tax prots across countries, making owners of capital indi¤erent towards the location of
production.
Keywords: tax/subsidy competition; foreign direct investment; international distribution of rm
ownership.
JEL classications: F12, F23, H25, H73.
1 Introduction
In many economic theory and policy contexts, we are accustomed to thinking of national
governments as competing with tax and subsidy instruments to attract the production plants
of foreign rms whose prots ow abroad. This assumption might be reasonable, for
example, in the case of competition between European states for the investments of Japanese
multinational enterprises (MNEs). However, in many cases (e.g., competition between EU
member countries for the investments of European MNEs), substantial portions of the rms
concerned are owned within the potential host countries themselves.
Increasing plant mobility has helped to undermine the traditional characterisation of
tax/subsidy competition given above: national governments must now face the possibility
that domestic rms will move production abroad if it is protable to do so. Moreover, the
globalisation of corporate ownership has made untenable the traditional assumption that
rms labelled foreigndue to their historical origins or the location of their headquarters
will be entirely owned abroad. For example, the current signicant scale of cross-border
share ownership is illustrated in a recent study by the Federation of European Securities
Exchanges (FESE, 2007): at the end of 2005, foreign investors accounted on average for one
third of the value of European equities markets.
These observations on plant mobility and the globalisation of corporate ownership mean
that the countries competing in scal inducements to attract mobile production plants fre-
quently own substantial shares in the rms concerned. In such cases, benevolent governments
will care about how tax/subsidy competition a¤ects the prot income accruing to their own
citizens. We examine the implications of this concern for both equilibrium tax/subsidy o¤ers
and plant locations, and we ask how a governments strategy to attract investment should
change with the international distribution of the rms ownership. The strong conclusion
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that we reach is that the strategy should be entirely independent of who owns the rm.
To illustrate some of the empirical issues involved, Table 1 below reports investment
subsidies that the European Commission approved in the EU car industry over 2001-2004.
The rst point to note is that these subsidies generally appear large as a proportion of to-
tal investment, perhaps large enough to overturn the e¤ects of corporate taxation on the
projects concerned. This underlines the importance for countries of getting their corporate
tax/subsidy policies right. Two further observations from the table challenge the traditional
characterisation of tax/subsidy competition, which sees the target rms as being foreign.
First, national governments appear to pay subsidies to both domestic and foreign car compa-
nies. Thus, the UK government gave subsidies to rms based in several countries: Japanese
Nissan, French Peugeot-Citroen as well as (ostensibly) British Vauxhall.1 Second, it is not
the case that car rms receive higher subsidies abroad than they do in their home markets:
the notionally German Volkswagen, for example, received a larger investment subsidy from
Germany than from Spain. This means that the traditional characterisation of tax/subsidy
competition as a contest for foreign rms is not even approximately correct.
It seems natural to expect that if the bidding countries own shares in the mobile rm,
their setting of corporate taxes/subsidies will reect a preference on the part of domestic
capital owners for production to be located where operating prots are maximized. This
intuition is, however, misleading. We show that the unique equilibrium of a tax/subsidy
competition game between two governments to attract the plant of a rm is independent of
how the rms ownership is distributed internationally. This Invariance Resultapplies both
to the equilibrium location of the rms plant and to the countriesequilibrium tax/subsidy
1 Indeed, it is unclear to what degree Vauxhall is British, being a subsidiary of General Motors. Given this
lack of clarity about the nationality of rms, the question of whether ownership matters for policy becomes all
the more important because, if it does, governments would need to invest in gathering the relevant ownership
data.
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Table 1: Approved investment subsidies to car manufacturers in EU member
states (2001-2004)
State aid Aid inten-
Company Host country (million ea) sity (%)b
Nissan U.K. 60 18.6
Volkswagen Germany 75 12.3
Daimler Chrysler Germany 57 30.9
Renault Spain 18 14.3
Vauxhall U.K. 15 6.4
BMW Germany 363 30.1
BMW Austria 16 15.3
Volkswagen Spain 20 6.4
Peugeot Citroen U.K. 30 9.8
a 1 British Pound is converted to 1.5 e
b Present value of state aid divided by present value of investment
Source: O¢ cial Journal of the European Communities, C and L (http://eur-lex.europa.eu)
o¤ers. Strikingly, it means that the nationality of the rm is irrelevant to the strategy that
a potential host country should follow in o¤ering investment incentives.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we set up a model
that focuses on the competition between two potential host countries for the plant of a
monopoly rm. Our theoretical framework is deliberately simple with minimal structure in
order to highlight the drivers of government/rm choices as clearly as possible. At the same
time, however, our analysis is consistent with a very wide range of government motivations in
tax/subsidy competitionfor example, the employment/wage gains from inward foreign direct
investment (FDI), technological spillovers to indigenous rms, tax revenue, prot income to
capital owners, and consumer surplus.
In section 3, we establish what e¤ect the international distribution of the MNEs own-
ership has on the equilibrium tax/subsidy o¤ers made to the rm and its equilibrium plant
location. We take the international distribution of the rms ownership as exogenous, placing
no restrictions as to how it is divided between the two bidding countries and the rest of the
world. Given this, we derive our Invariance Result which shows that, under tax/subsidy
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competition, both the equilibrium plant location and tax/subsidy o¤ers are independent of
the international distribution of rm ownership.
In the conclusion, we present two important implications of our Invariance Result.
2 A Model of Tax Competition
We model the tax/subsidy competition between two host countries for the production plant
of a monopoly rm. We want to investigate how the international distribution of the rms
ownership a¤ects the countriesequilibrium tax/subsidy o¤ers and the plants equilibrium
location. For this purpose, we partition the world into a region, which contains the potential
host countries A and B, and the rest of the world (RoW). If the MNE wishes to serve
consumers in the region, it must invest in either A or B as we assume that trade costs
between the region and RoW are prohibitive. In contrast, we make no specic assumptions
(in terms of either levels or symmetry) about intra-regional trade costs between A and B. For
simplicity and in line with much of the existing literature, we rule out two-plant entry, where
the rm sets up plants in both countries. However, as with Hauer and Wooton (1999), it
would be straightforward to introduce explicitly into our analysis a plant xed cost F that
is su¢ ciently large to rule out the choice of two plants in equilibrium.
Tax/subsidy competition is represented by a three-stage game of complete information.
In stage one, countries A and B simultaneously and irreversibly post bids BA and BB,
respectively, which can be either taxes (< 0) or subsidies (> 0) and act as location-specic
xed costs. In stage two, the monopolist decides where to locate its plant, choosing between
production in country A or country B or opting for ?, where ? represents choosing not
to invest in the region (and thereby not serving the regional market). Finally, the product
markets in A and B are served in stage three. We solve the game backwards to isolate its
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
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2.1 Prots of the Firm
We denote by j the rms pre-tax prots on its operations within the region when its
plant is located in country j 2 fA;Bg. If, for example, the rm chooses A, then it serves
consumers in market A with local production and those in market B with exports. The j
term comprises variable prots, earned on the basis of monopoly pricing in both countries,
and any plant-specic xed cost. However, as with trade costs, we place no restrictions on
the rms production costs in the two countries.
If the rms cost structures are identical in A and B and if intra-regional trade is costless,
then A = B. If trade is costly, this equality will not generally hold unless the countries
demand sides are also identical. Thus, for example, with identical cost structures and costly
trade, we would have A > B if As market were larger than that of B. In order to avoid
an extensive and unrewarding taxonomy, we assume
A  B  0 (1)
There are two elements to this assumption. The rst (A;B  0) is that the rm would
nd it protable to set up in either country under laissez faire (BA = BB = 0). Thus,
while the countries may choose to o¤er subsidies (BA; BB > 0) in order to attract the
MNEs investment, these are not required to make local production protable in absolute
terms. Such subsidies would merely alter the relative protability of alternative locations.
Of course, the host countries may seek to tax the MNEs investment. We assume that such
corporate taxes (represented by BA; BB < 0) are source-based and that no double taxation
of dividend income occurs in the capital owners country of residence.2
The second element of assumption (1) is that country A is, for whatever reason, the more
protable country in which to invest: A  B.This is innocuous and can be interpreted as
2 See Keen (1993) for an empirical defence of the assumption of source-based coprate taxes.
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a convention on how we label the host countries. Thus, in the absence of any inducements
from the competing governments, the MNE will choose A over B. Let   = A   B  0,
the international prot di¤erential, be called country As geographic advantage.
The rm chooses its location and prices to maximize post-tax prots, which constitute
the aggregate income accruing to owners of capital.3 Post-tax prots j are given by
j =
8>><>>:
j +Bj if j = A;B
0 if j = ?
where j 2 fA;B;?g represents the rms location choice.
[INSERT FIGURE HERE]
Figure 1: The Firms Location Choice
Figure 1 illustrates the rms location choice when faced with di¤erent o¤ers from the
competing, potential-host nations. The bid space is divided into 3 regions. Region ? corre-
sponds to the case where both countries set such high taxes on the MNE that its after-tax
prots would be negative in both A and B, and it chooses not to invest (and receives zero
prots). If BA   A and BB   B, then the rm chooses between investing in A and B,
both of which o¤er positive post-tax prots. In the absence of o¤ers from either government
(BA = BB = 0), As geographic advantage means that the rm will invest there. Otherwise,
if Bs nancial inducement BB is su¢ ciently large to o¤set As combined geographic advan-
tage and its own o¤er BA, then the rm will invest in B. Thus, B wins the competition
if BB   BA >  . Clearly, the MNE will be indi¤erent between locations A and B when
post-tax prots are equalised, A = 

B, that is,
  +BA  BB = 0. (2)
3 It might be argued that a rm should maximize the utility of owners, rather than their income. When a
rm has market power, these two do not necessarily coincide. Since prot maximization is simpler to analyse
(it avoids the need to specify utility functions for owners), one could assume that capital ownerspreferences
are such that they choose not to consume the good in question.
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2.2 Governments and Welfare
We assume that the governments of countries A and B are benevolent, being motivated
by national social welfare, and that they set their taxes/subsidies independently. The gov-
ernments must balance their budgets and their only function is to redistribute income in a
lump-sum manner between their citizens and the rms owners. We further assume that the
governments do not discriminate between domestic and foreign capital ownersfor example,
by imposing a withholding tax on outward prot ows.4
Corporate taxes in our model take the form of location-specic xed costs, rather than
proportional prots taxes. There are two justications for this modelling choice. First, in
reality, proportional prots taxes are typically set for the whole economy, rather than for
specic industries. Our operating prot terms, A and B, could be assumed to capture all
economy-wide tax inuences, which are exogenous to the particular industry in our model.
Second, we will show that corporate subsidies typically arise in our equilibrium and it seems
natural to regard these as lump-sumfor example, as either direct cash payments to rms or
the public provision of infrastructure at the plant.
We assume that the social welfare of country i when the rm chooses plant location j
takes the following form:
Wij =
8>><>>:
ei

j  Bi + Sij if i = j
ei

j + Sij if i 6= j
(3)
where i 2 fA;Bg and j 2 fA;B;?g. The rst term of (3) measures the income of capital
owners in country i from the prots of the MNE, where ei is the share of after-tax prots that
are remitted to residents of country i. Bi measures the cost to host country i of its subsidy
payments to the rm, paid only when the country is succesful in attracting the investment
4 In appendix 2, we extend our model to incorporate withholding taxes on the outward prot ows that
accrue to foreign capital owners. We highlight circumstances where our central Invariance Result continues
to hold.
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of the MNE. The nal welfare term, Sij , captures all other components of national social
welfare.
The welfare function in (3) is intuitively appealing and, as we show in Appendix 1, it can
be formally microfounded by invoking the widespread assumption of quasi-linear preferences.
In these circumstances, Sij would constitute consumer surplus arising for citizens of country
i when the rm locates in country j.
2.3 The Social Benets of Investment
For the sake of brevity, we focus on the following case, which appears to be the most empir-
ically relevant, in solving the game:
Sii  Sij  Si? for all i; j 2 fA;Bg ; i 6= j (4)
We are making two assumptions in (4). The rst (Sij  Si?) is that social benets are
created whenever the market is served, even if only by imports from the other country in
the region. This reects the notion that countries derive benets (e.g., in terms of increased
consumer surplus) whenever the product market is served, compared to the good being
unavailable in the marketplace. Thus, even if the production takes place in another country,
there are consumption benets arising from importing the good. The second assumption in
(4) is that local production of the good yields higher social benets than imports (Sii  Sij).
This reects what seems to be a widely-held government view. There are many possible
reasons why, independently of capital income and tax/subsidy payments, host countries
may favour local production, and our models generality means that it is consistent with
all of them. For example, there may be labour market benets from inward FDI. MNEs
may o¤er wage premia above workersoutside options, a polar case of which occurs when
inward FDI relieves involuntary unemployment (Haaparanta, 1996 and Bjorvatn and Eckel,
2006). Alternatively, inward FDI may be associated with localized technological spillovers
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to indigenous rms (Fumagalli, 2003 and Olsen and Osmundsen, 2003). Finally, in the case
where trade between A and B is costly, the market price will be lower, and consumer surplus
higher, under local production, and benevolent governments will recognise this (Hauer and
Wooton, 1999).
Of course, one can envisage factors that would tend to push Sij above Sii (i 6= j). Were
there, for example, environmental pollution localized around the plant or if the other country
o¤ered lower variable production costs then this would favor foreign over local production.
However, the fact that governments frequently o¤er inducements to inward FDI in practice
suggests that such apparently perverse e¤ects are, in general, not su¢ ciently strong as to
overturn the ranking in (4).
3 The Role of Ownership
We assume that the rms ownership is distributed internationally in arbitrary proportions
between A, B and RoW and that the rms post-tax prots are distributed internationally
to its owners according to their ownership shares. Let equity shares eA and eB measure
the proportions of the rm owned in countries A and B, respectively. We take eA; eB to
be exogenous, and they must satisfy eA; eB  0 and eA + eB  1, where 1   eA   eB is
the share of the rm owned in RoW. We now proceed to determine how the international
pattern of rm ownership a¤ects the o¤ers made to the rm to induce it to invest and the
rms consequent choice of location in equilibrium.
In Figure 1, RA and RB are the countriesbest response functions in bid space. Since
the two countriesdecision problems are qualitatively identical, we focus for concreteness on
the actions of country A, which owns a share eA of the rm. It is clear that if A chooses to
set a bid that attracts the rm, it will always set the lowest possible such bid. Therefore,
RA will never lie above the lower boundary of the A region in Figure 1.
9
If BB <  B, so that the rm prefers ? to B, then country A when setting BA e¤ectively
chooses between plant locations A and ? . Under our assumptions (1) and (4), it is clear
that country A will choose to attract the rm with a bid of (just above)  A in this case.
Local production generates both tax revenue and wider social benets for A over the ?
outcome, while the rms post-tax prots are pushed down to zero. Therefore, RA lies along
the horizontal bottom border of the A region in Figure 1.
If BB   B, then the rm locates in either A or B as locating in B dominates ?. If it
hosts the rm, country As social welfare is
WAA = eA (A +BA) BA + SAA,
while As welfare if B hosts the rm is
WAB = eA (B +BB) + SAB.
Consequently, As welfare gain from local production compared to importing is
WAA  WAB = eA (  +BA  BB) BA + SAA   SAB (5)
This welfare change is just the sum of the changes in the income of As capital owners,
corporate tax revenue, and the welfare of the rest of society.
What is country As valuation of the plant? In other words, what is the maximum that
A is willing to pay to attract local production? Assuming that A behaves optimally, it will
post the smallest bid necessary to attract the investment away from country B. Therefore,
the MNE will be left essentially indi¤erent between locations. Consequently, (2) will hold,
which reduces (5) to
WAA  WAB = VA  BA, (6)
where
VA = SAA   SAB  0
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denotes As valuation of the plant. Therefore, for any international distribution of ownership,
country A is willing to pay at most VA in subsidies to win the plant. Likewise, for any share
eB 2 [0; 1  eA] of the rm owned in B, country Bs valuation is VB = SBB   SBA  0.
Therefore, whenever government A can attract the rm with a bid less than VA, it does so.
Otherwise, it sets BA = VA. This accounts for the kink in RA at BA = VA.5
It follows from our construction of the RA function that there exists a unique perfect
equilibrium along the 45-degree line in Figure 1 at point E. The identity of the winning
country depends on whether
VB   VA ?   (7)
In other words, the rms choice of investment location turns crucially upon whether Bs
valuation is su¢ ciently greater than As to overcome the latters geographic advantage. We
shall refer to VB   VA as the valuation premium that B places on the rm.
In the perfect equilibrium, illustrated at point E in Figure 1, country A wins the plant.
Country B o¤ers a subsidy equal to its valuation, VB, and country As winning bid, BA, just
exceeds Bs subsidy less As geographic advantage:
BA = VB     + ": (8)
Country As winning bid of (8) therefore leaves the rm almost indi¤erent between the two
production locations as post-tax prots are only innitesimally higher if the rm locates in
A.
The following Proposition characterises our games perfect equilibrium:
Proposition: (i) If pre-tax prots are equal in the two countries, A = B, then the country
5 We assume that the countries never post weakly dominated bids, which rules out all BA > VA and
BB > VB . All BA > VA are weakly dominated by BA = VA. Pick any B0A > VA. Then for all BB < B
0
A +  ,
country As welfare is strictly higher with BA = VA (either SAA VA or SAB) than with BA = B0A (SAA B0A).
For all BB > B0A +  , country A is indi¤erent between BA = VA; B
0
A.
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with the higher valuation wins the rm and pays a subsidy of just above the other
countrys valuation. (ii) If pre-tax prots are higher in A than in B, A > B, then
country B wins the plant if and only if its valuation premium exceeds the geographic
advantage o¤ered by A.
When A = B, the tax/subsidy competition is a standard rst-price auction. When
A > B, as shown in Figure 1, the magnitude of country As geographic advantage matters
for the equilibrium. If the countriesbids are equal, then the rm will choose country A
because of its geographic advantage. Therefore, in order to win the bidding contest, country
A need not match Bs bid. Indeed, A can undercut B by the exact amount of its geographic
advantage and still leave the rm indi¤erent between locations. (If   is su¢ ciently large,
the possibility emerges that the monopolist could be taxed by A in equilibrium.) Such a
recognition by the bidding countries of the importance of geographic advantages underlies
the result in part (ii).6
Because the countriesmaximum bids, VA and VB, are independent of national ownership
shares, it follows immediately that the countriesbest response functions RA and RB, and
consequently the equilibrium point E, are all independent of eA and eB. This establishes our
central result:
Invariance Result: The equilibrium plant location and tax/subsidy o¤ers are independent
of the international distribution of rm ownership.
This Invariance Result is striking in its simplicity and is also very strong. Perhaps the
6 It is worth briey highlighting that there are obvious circumstances where one country would possess
both a valuation premium and a geographic advantage. For example, consider the case where the countries
xed/variable cost structures are identical but trade is costly and country A contains more identical households
than B. Here A > B due to As larger market. However, we would also expect VA > VB because
the aggregate benets from inward FDI to both workers (e.g., wage premia) and indigenous rms (e.g.,
technological spillovers) will be greater in the larger market, where the MNE will employ more workers and
where (reasonably) there will be more indigenous rms to benet from non-rivalrous spillovers. This is the
specic case illustrated in Figure 1.
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most remarkable implication is that the equilibrium with an arbitrary international distribu-
tion of ownership is identical to that under the special case of extra-regional rm ownership
(eA = eB = 0), which has been extensively analysed in the literature (e.g., Hauer and
Wooton, 1999).7 Thus the outcome of tax competition for a footloose production plant will
be the same, regardless of who owns the rm.
The intuition behind the Invariance Result runs as follows. When considering whether
to entice the rm away from its rival, a country has to determine at what point, as the
rival country posts higher bids, trumping the rivals bid (that is, only just improving on the
rivals o¤er) is no longer worthwhile. As trumping leaves the rm with essentially identical
after-tax prots from producing in either location, a countrys capital owners are indi¤erent
to it. Therefore, any gain in welfare from local production must originate from the rest of
society and this remains the same whoever owns the rm.
At rst glance the Invariance Result seems counter-intuitive. For example, assume that
A > B. In this case, a sensible prior would seem to be that increasing eA should increase
As valuation of the plant, because the income of capital owners in A would be highest
under local production in the more protable location. This intuition is false because it links
capital income directly to pre-tax prots, A and B, whereas the owners of capital derive
income from the rms post-tax prots, A and 

B, which are endogenously determined
and equal across the two countries in equilibrium. The tax/subsidy competition equalises
post-tax prots across countries because the winning country never pays more for the plant
than it has to. This makes owners of capital indi¤erent to the location of production and
means that income from capital falls out of the countrieswelfare comparisons between local
7 To see this, substitute eA = 0 into (3) to give WAA = SAA   BA and WAB = SAB . In this case, As
reservation price is clearly VA.
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and foreign production.8
We end this section by briey discussing the key assumptions behind our Invariance
Result. Our social welfare function, Wij , is additively separable and linear in post-tax
capital income, social benets, and tax/subsidy payments. In Appendix 1, we provide explicit
microfoundations for Wij , taking preferences and technology as primitives adopting a quasi-
linear and quadratic household utility function that is widely used in the related literature.
Additive separability is important for the Invariance Result because it allows us to cancel
the capital-income terms in (5). However, it is not strictly necessary for Wij to be linear
in its three arguments.9 The Invariance Result would continue to hold with, for example,
a diminishing marginal utility of capital income and an increasing marginal cost of public
funds. To incorporate these extensions, we would rewrite (3) as
Wij =
8>><>>:
u(ei

j )  c(Bi) + Sij if i = j
u(ei

j ) + Sij if i 6= j
(9)
where u0 () ; c0 () > 0 and c00 () > 0 > u00 (). In this case, it is straightforward to show that
country i would be prepared to pay at most c 1 (Vi) in subsidies for the plant. Moreover,
if c0 (0) = 1, such that the marginal cost of public funds progressively rises from unity, then
country is reservation price is strictly less than Vi.
Another prominent assumption is that of monopoly. In practice, rms tend to face rivals
on the product market. Our model could easily be extended to oligopoly by assuming that
tax/subsidy-setting discriminates between rival rms and that we are analysing the contest
for a single rms plant within an oligopolistic industry. In such a case, the prot income
8 It might be thought that in the eA = 1 case, country A would be indi¤erent between all BA because
any subsidy payment is recycled entirely to domestic capital owners. However, this is false. If, for example,
BB were extremely large, then A would prefer to lose the contest as this outcome would yield huge overseas
prot income for its citizens.
9 Nor, in the case where W is linear, do we need the weights on its three arguments to be equal. For
example, our results would be una¤ected if the governments placed a greater weight on prot income than on
other components of social welfare.
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from rival rms in the same industry would ow into our Sij terms. Our Invariance Result
would then state that the equilibrium of the bidding contest for any given rm is independent
of that particular rms ownership distribution.
4 Conclusion
The key contribution of this paper is our Invariance Result, which states that the equilibrium
of the tax/subsidy competition between two countries for a monopoly rms plant is, in all
respects, independent of how the rms ownership is distributed internationally.
We close by pointing out two implications of our Invariance Result. The rst concerns its
relation to debates on the informational requirements for optimal policy choices. If a coun-
trys reservation price for a plant is independent of how the rms ownership is distributed
internationally, then it follows directly that a country does not need to know the international
distribution of ownership to work out its reservation price. Therefore, our Invariance Result
shows that optimal behaviour in tax/subsidy competition is possible without any knowledge
of how rm ownership is distributedinformation that is generally very hard to obtain. A
further policy implication is that the recent concern, expressed by both the OECD (1998)
and the EU (European Commission, 1998), that foreign rms tend to receive preferential tax
treatment because they are foreign may be misplaced.
Secondly, our Invariance Result suggests that tax/subsidy competition for its plants
should not play a role in explaining the international distribution of a rms ownership,
which our analysis takes as exogenous. For example, if rm owners gained much more
from tax/subsidy competition under some international ownership distributions than others,
then one could reasonably expect the bestdistributions to tend to arise in capital market
equilibrium. However, our Invariance Result renders such a selection between ownership
distributions impossible.
15
References
Bjorvatn, Kjetil and Carsten Eckel (2006), Policy Competition for Foreign Direct
Investment between Asymmetric Countries. European Economic Review 50, 1891-
1907.
European Commission (1998), Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting on 1
December 1997 Concerning Taxation Policy.O¢ cial Journal of the European Com-
munities C2, 6/1/98, 1-6.
FESE (2007), Share Ownership Structure in Europe.Report prepared for the Fed-
eration of European Securities Exchanges, available at www.fese.be/en.
Fumagalli, Chiara (2003), On the Welfare E¤ects of Competition for Foreign Direct
Investments.European Economic Review 47, 963-983.
Haaparanta, Pertti (1996). Competition for Foreign Direct Investments.Journal of
Public Economics 63, 141-153.
Hauer, Andreas, and Ian Wooton (1999), Country Size and Tax Competition for
Foreign Direct Investment.Journal of Public Economics 71, 121-139.
Keen, Michael (1993), The Welfare Economics of Tax Co-ordination in the European
Community: A Survey.Fiscal Studies 14, 15-36.
OECD (1998). Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue. Paris: Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Olsen, Trond E., and Petter Osmundsen (2003). Spillovers and International Compe-
tition for Investments.Journal of International Economics 59, 211-238.
Ottaviano, Gianmarco I. P., and Tanguy van Ypersele (2005). Market Size and Tax
Competition.Journal of International Economics 67, 25-46.
5 Appendix 1: Derivation of the Social Welfare Function, Wij
In this appendix, we provide explicit microfoundations for the social welfare function, Wij ,
that we use in the main text and for the interpretation of Sij as a measure of consumer
surplus. The host-country economies, A and B, have the following familiar structure (also
used, for example, by Hauer and Wooton, 1999; and Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2005,
amongst many others). Both countries contain two sectors: X, the industry under analysis,
and Y , which produces a numeraire good using only labour under perfect competition and
constant returns to scale. Therefore, the real wage equals labour productivity in Y , y. Total
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post-tax household income in country i equals y Bi+eij , where the rm chooses location
j and Bi represents lump-sum taxes (this expression normalises the number of workers to 1).
The household maximizes the quasi-linear quadratic utility U = X 0:5X2+Y subject
to the budget constraint y  Bi + eij  pXX + Y , which binds in equilibrium because the
marginal utility of Y is 1. In consumer equilibrium (with su¢ ciently high post-tax income
so that Y > 0), X =   pX and
U = ei

j  Bi + [0:5 (  pX)2 + y].
The above expression takes the form of the social welfare function Wij in (3) in the main
text with Sij = 0:5 (  pX)2 + y being a measure of consumer surplus in market X. Of
course, when changes in utility are considered, the real wage y drops out, so changes in Sij
are driven solely by changes in consumer surplus.
It remains to show that this explicit formulation of Sij is consistent with (4), our assumed
ranking of social benets from attracting the investment. This will arise if, for example, we
follow Hauer and Wooton (1999) in assuming that national markets for X are segmented
and that there are international costs associated with transporting goods between countries.
In such a situation, the domestic price of X will depend upon the location of production.
If the rm does not invest in either country, the market is not served and hence Si? = 0.
Should it invest in the region, a monopoly provider will set its prices as markups over the
marginal cost of serving a particular market. Hence domestic production will result in lower
prices than imports and, consequently, higher consumer surplus. Thus the incorporation of
transport costs yields the ranking in (4).
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6 Appendix 2: Equilibrium with Withholding Taxes
Our main analysis assumed that corporate taxes/subsidies were applied to the rms total
operating prots at source, following which prot income was distributed to the rms owners
without further taxation (either in the host country or in the owners home countries).
However, in reality, countries sometimes impose withholding taxes on the outward prot
ows that accrue to foreign capital owners. In this appendix, we examine how the imposition
of withholding taxes a¤ects our equilibrium.
Assume that both countries apply proportional withholding taxes to outward ows of
prot income to the rms foreign owners. Denote the withholding tax rates by tA and tB,
and assume that they are set for the whole economy and so are exogenous to our partial
equilibrium analysis.
We get revised expressions for social welfare in country A:
WAA = eA

A + SAA  BA + tA (1  eA)A
WAB = eA (1  tB)B + SAB
We can now derive country As valuation of the rm in the presence of withholding taxes.
Country A prefers winning the rm if and only if WAA WAB, i.e. i¤
eA

A + SAA  BA + tA (1  eA)A  eA (1  tB)B + SAB,
which can be rearranged to give
SAA   SAB + eA (1  tA)A + tAA   eA (1  tB)B  BA (10)
The question now arises: What measures of prot income does the tax/subsidy competition
between countries A and B equalise? The fact that, in the absence of withholding taxes,
tax/subsidy competition equalises the rms post-tax prots across the two countries  to
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make the rms owners indi¤erent between locations is the key to our Invariance Result in
the main text. However, with withholding taxes, the plant-location preferences of the rms
owners will di¤er depending on where they live i.e., for given tax/subsidy levels, there will
not typically be unanimity amongst the rms owners about the optimal plant location. This
consideration clearly complicates the analysis of equilibrium under withholding taxes. For
simplicity, we introduce the notion of a decisive set of owners: a subset of the rms owners
is decisive if they can collectively determine the rms choices. Moreover, for brevity, we
restrict attention to the three cases where the rm has a decisive group of owners in one of
fA;B;RoWg since, in these three cases, the rms responses to given values of the policy
parameters are clear.
If owners in RoW are decisive, then the rm will locate its plant in the country that o¤ers
the higher level of post-withholding-tax prots, (1  tj)j . Therefore, the industry-specic
policy variables BA and BB will optimally be set so that (1  tA)A = (1  tB)B, and
condition (10) becomes
SAA   SAB + tAA  BA
The LHS of this condition gives As valuation of the rm, and it is independent of the
national ownership shares, eA and eB. Therefore, if owners in RoW are decisive, then our
Invariance Result continues to hold in the presence of withholding taxes in the sense that
equilibrium choices are independent of the international distribution of the rms ownership.
(Note, however, that because country A retains withholding tax revenue when it hosts the
plant, its valuation of the plant rises in the presence of withholding taxes.)
If owners in A are decisive, then the tax/subsidy competition will make them indi¤erent
between the two locations and set eAA = eA (1  tB)B. Using this equality to simplify
(10), it is straightforward to show that As valuation of the plant then depends negatively
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on eA because As withholding tax revenue falls as eA rises. If owners in B are decisive so
eB

B = eB (1  tA)A in equilibrium, then no immediate simplication of (10) is possible.
Therefore, with decisive owners in either A or B, the countriesvaluations, and hence also
the equilibrium, typically depend on the national ownership shares.
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